We prove that all extensions of Heyting Arithmetic with a logic that has the finite frame property possess the de Jongh property.

In this paper the system IL for relative interpretability is studied.

We prove that all extensions of Heyting Arithmetic with a logic that has the finite frame property possess the de Jongh property.

Albert Einstein a proposé trois tests de relativité générale, appelés plus tard les tests classiques de relativité générale, en 1916 : la précession de l'orbite de Mercure, la déviation de la lumière du soleil, et le décalage vers le rouge gravitationnel de la lumière. Dicke et Schiff ont établi un cadre pour tester la relativité générale , y compris par le biais d'expériences nulles et en utilisant la physique de l'exploration spatiale, de l'électronique et de la matière condensée, comme l'expérience (...) Pound-Rebka et l'interférométrie laser. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.33735.93607. (shrink)

Spanish version of my analysis of Oaxaca-based experimental filmmaker Bruno Varela's 2022 feature-length film El Prototipo, which draws on ideas from Philip K. Dick's novel Valis.

By formalizing some classical facts about provably total functions of intuitionistic primitive recursive arithmetic (iPRA), we prove that the set of decidable formulas of iPRA and of iΣ1+ (intuitionistic Σ1-induction in the language of PRA) coincides with the set of its provably ∆1-formulas and coincides with the set of its provably atomic formulas. By the same methods, we shall give another proof of a theorem of Marković and De Jongh: the decidable formulas of HA are its provably ∆1-formulas.

The book covers scientific and philosophical topics by bringing them closer to literature. Some topics are scientific explanation, the concept of cause, rational argumentation, pseudoscience, language, ethics, philosophy of mind, posthumanism, and democracy. Summary Prefazione di Severino Saccardi. Introduzione. Capitolo 1: Le scrivanie di Eddington. 1.1. Il vecchio Qfwfq (I. Calvino. Le cosmicomiche). 1.2. L’assassino invisibile (L.F. Celine, Il dottor Semmelweis). 1.3. Gli gnommeri di Ingravallo (C.E. Gadda, Quer pasticciaccio brutto de via Merulana). 1.4. I sergenti di Napoleone (L. Tolstoj, (...) Guerra e pace). 1.5. Tex e il Coyote nero (G. Bonelli, Il Coyote nero). 1.6. “Elementare Watson!” (A.C. Doyle, Il segno dei quattro). Capitolo 2. Non saranno mai delusi. 2.1. L’albero di Natale. (V. Perrin, Cambiare l’acqua ai fiori). 2.2. Il dagherrotipo di Buendia. (G.G. Marquez, Cent’anni di solitudine). 2.3. Don Ferrante e la peste. (A. Manzoni, I promessi sposi). Capitolo 3. Capitolo puffo. 3.1. L’Accademia di Lagado. (J. Swift, I viaggi di Gulliver). 3.2. Bruto è uomo d’onore. (W. Shakespeare, Giulio Cesare). 3.3. Le oche mute. (G. Orwell, 1984). Capitolo 4. “Quarantadue!” 4.1. Lo zio N’Ba N’Ga. (I. Calvino, Le cosmicomiche). 4.2. La mosca cocchiera. (J. de La Fontaine, Favole). 4.3. Il fiore del dr. Dek. (E. Salgari, Le meraviglie del Duemila). Capitolo 5. L’ultimo uomo. 5.1. La pernice accusatrice. (Cyrano de Bergerac, Gli stati e gli imperi del Sole). 5.2. Pallino in via Mjasnickaja. (M.A. Bulgakov, Cuore di cane). Capitolo 6. Scenari perturbanti. 6.1. Dissipatio. (G. Morselli, Dissipatio H.G.). 6.2. Un mammifero meccanizzato. (S. Butler, Erewhon). 6.3. Mlle Olimpia. (E.T.A. Hoffmann, Racconti notturni). Capitolo 7. La gente perbene. 7.1. La balena bianca. (H. Melville, Moby Dick). 7.2. Betsabea Everdeene. (T. Hardy, Via dalla pazza folla). 7.3. Un’idea francese. (C. McCarthy, Cavalli selvaggi). 7.4. Le montagne del Montana. (D. Delillo, Rumore bianco). (shrink)

Carl Knight argues that lexical sufficientarianism, which holds that sufficientarian concerns should have lexical priority over other distributive goals, is ‘excessive’ in many distinct ways and that sufficientarians should either defend weighted sufficientarianism or become prioritarians. In this article, I distinguish three types of weighted sufficientarianism and propose a weighted sufficientarian view that meets the excessiveness objection and is preferable to both Knight’s proposal and prioritarianism. More specifically, I defend a multi-threshold view which gives weighted priority to benefits directly above (...) and below its thresholds, but gives benefits below the lowest threshold lexical priority over benefits above the highest threshold. (shrink)

In this article, I propose a novel characterization of sufficientarianism. I argue that sufficientarianism combines three claims: a priority claim that we have non-instrumental reasons to prioritize benefits in certain ranges over benefits in other ranges; a continuum claim that at least two of those ranges are on one continuum; and a deficiency claim that the lower a range on a continuum, the more priority benefits in that range have. This characterization of sufficientarianism sheds new light on two long-standing philosophical (...) debates, namely about the distinctiveness of sufficientarianism as a distributive principle and about the common objections to sufficientarianism. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that limitarian policies are a good means to further political equality. Limitarianism, which is a view coined and defended by Robeyns, is a partial view in distributive justice which claims that under non-ideal circumstances it is morally impermissible to be rich. In a recent paper, Volacu and Dumitru level two arguments against Robeyns’ Democratic Argument for limitarianism. The Democratic Argument states that limitarianism is called for given the undermining influence current inequalities in income and wealth (...) have for the value of democracy and political equality. Volacu and Dumitru’s Incentive Objection holds that limitarianism places an excessive and inefficient burden on the rich in ensuring political equality. The Efficacy Objection holds that even if limitarianism limits excessive wealth it still fails to ensure the preservation of political equality. In this paper, I will argue that both of these objections fail, but on separate grounds. I argue that the Incentive objection fails because one could appeal to limitarian policies that are different from the ones discussed by Volacu and Dumitru and which escape the problem of reduced productivity. I argue against the Efficacy Objection that limitarian policies are a partial but highly valuable step towards establishing political equality, and that they can and should complement or be complemented by other strategies. (shrink)

Despite the prominence of thresholds in theories of distributive justice, there is no general account of what sort of role is played by the idea of a threshold within such theories. This has allowed an ongoing lack of clarity and misunderstanding around views that employ thresholds. In this article, I develop an account of the concept of thresholds in distributive justice. I argue that this concept contains three elements, which threshold views deploy when ranking possible distributions. These elements are (i) (...) the level of the threshold, (ii) what constitutes the value of the threshold, and (iii) how benefits above and below the threshold must be allocated. I highlight three contributions that this particular account of thresholds makes: it clarifies the nature of the shift that occurs at the threshold; it resolves a common misunderstanding about headcount principles; and it shows how the arbitrariness objection can be met. (shrink)

Limitarianism holds that there is an upper limit to how many resources, such as wealth and income, people can permissibly have. In this article, I examine the conceptual structure of limitarianism. I focus on the upper limit and the idea that resources above the limit are ‘excess resources’. I distinguish two possible limitarian views about such resources: (i) that excess resources have zero moral value for the holder; and (ii) that excess resources do have moral value for the holder but (...) that their claim to such resources is outweighed by other normative concerns. Moreover, I argue that, depending on the values limitarianism seeks to promote, limitarians should care about the number of people with excess resources or the total amount of excess resources (or both), that they can adopt redistributive measures and/or predistributive measures, and that some versions of limitarianism should take into account the distribution of risk among those above the riches line. (shrink)

The philosophy of biomimicry, I argue, consists of four main areas of inquiry. The first, which has already been explored by Freya Mathews, concerns the “deep” question of what Nature ultimately is. The second, third, and fourth areas correspond to the three basic principles of biomimicry as laid out by Janine Benyus. “Nature as model” is the poetic principle of biomimicry, for it tells us how it is that things are to be “brought forth”. “Nature as measure” is the ethical (...) principle of biomimicry, for it tells us that Nature places ethical limits or standards on what it is possible for us to accomplish. And “Nature as mentor” is the epistemological principle of biomimicry, for it affirms that Nature is the ultimate source of truth, wisdom, and freedom from error. Within this overall framework, I argue that seeing Nature as physis—understood as “self-production” or “self-placing-into-the-open”—constitutes the requisite ground for the poetic, ethical, and epistemological principles of biomimicry, and that biomimicry thus conceived involves a new philosophical paradigm, which I call “enlightened naturalism”. (shrink)

A central question in contemporary ethics and political philosophy concerns which entities have moral status. In this article, I provide a detailed analysis of the view that moral status comes in degrees. I argue that degrees of moral status can be specified along two dimensions: (i) the weight of the reason to protect an entity’s morally significant rights and interests; and/or (ii) the rights and interests that are considered morally significant. And I explore some of the complexities that arise when (...) we link degrees of moral status to the weight of reasons to protect bundles and/or the content and size of these bundles, in particular regarding the attribution of moral status to nonparadigmatic entities (e.g. people with severe cognitive disabilities, children, embryos and foetuses, robots, non-human animals, ecosystems, and rivers). (shrink)

According to the sufficiency theory of justice in health, justice requires that people have equal access to adequate health. In this article, I lay out the structure of this view and I assess its distributive implications for setting priority (i) between health needs across persons and (ii) between health care spending and other societal goods. I argue, first, that according to the sufficiency theory, deficiency in health cannot be completely offset by providing other societal goods. And, second, that it can (...) prevent the medicalization of societies by stressing that improvements beyond the level of adequate health have relatively little weight, if any, from the standpoint of justice. (shrink)

In earlier work on limitarianism, I argued that setting an upper limit to the amount of wealth that people can permissibly have is justified when decision-makers are unaware of or disagree about the appropriate distributive criterion or if they are unaware of people’s relevant features (or both). Robert Huseby has raised several powerful objections to this presumptive argument for limitarianism. Some of these objections call for a revision of my defence of presumptive limitarianism while others call for clarification, both of (...) which I aim to do in this chapter. I will argue that unless decision-makers have substantive reasons to suggest otherwise, they must act as if there is an upper limit to the amount of wealth that people can permissibly have. (shrink)

Aldo Leopold accorded great significance to the images he used to describe both the land and humankind’s relation to it. Focusing on three key images of Leopold’s “ecological imaginary”—the balance, the pyramid, and the round river—this article argues that the most profound of these is the round river. Contrasting this image with James Lovelock’s portrayal of the earth as Gaia, it further argues that Leopold’s round river can be interpreted as a contemporary, ecological reworking of the primordial, Homeric experience of (...) Being, according to which the foundation of the world is a round river, Oceanus. (shrink)

The growing concentration of wealth has acquired a new urgency in recent years. One particular view in this context is developed by Ingrid Robeyns in her ground-breaking work on limitarianism. According to this view, no one should have more than a certain amount of valuable goods, such as income and wealth. The contributors to this symposium, Brian Berkey, David Axelsen and Lasse Nielsen, Jessica Flanigan and Christopher Freiman, and Lena Halldenius, critically examine various aspects of limitarianism. In particular, they examine (...) how limitarianism should be interpreted and developed as a principle of justice, on what reasons speak in favour and against limitarianism, and on how limitarianism relates to other principles of distributive justice. Our hope is that this symposium will contribute to the ongoing debate in political philosophy about the concentration of wealth and economic justice. (shrink)

Locke’s property rights are now usually understood to be both fundamental and strictly negative. Fundamental because they are thought to be basic constraints on what we may do, unconstrained by anything deeper. Negative because they are thought to only protect a property holder against the claims of others. Here, I argue that this widespread interpretation is mistaken. For Locke, property rights are constrained by the deeper ‘fundamental law of nature,’ which involves positive obligations to those in need and confines the (...) right to excess property within circumstances where it is not needed to preserve human life. (shrink)

Although Heidegger thinks cybernetics is the “supreme danger,” he also thinks that it harbours within itself poiēsis, the “saving power.” This article providesa justification of this position through an analysis of its relation to Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela’s Santiago theory of cognition and James Lovelock and Lynn Margulis’ Gaia theory. More specifically, it argues that Maturana and Varela’s criticism of cybernetics and their concomitant theory of “autopoiesis” constitutes the philosophical disclosure of “Being itself,” and that the extension of Santiago (...) theory’s various different conceptualizations of poiēsis to Gaia theory makes possible the rise of the “saving power.”. (shrink)

Members of the field of philosophy have, just as other people, political convictions or, as psychologists call them, ideologies. How are different ideologies distributed and perceived in the field? Using the familiar distinction between the political left and right, we surveyed an international sample of 794 subjects in philosophy. We found that survey participants clearly leaned left (75%), while right-leaning individuals (14%) and moderates (11%) were underrepresented. Moreover, and strikingly, across the political spectrum, from very left-leaning individuals and moderates to (...) very right-leaning individuals, participants reported experiencing ideological hostility in the field, occasionally even from those from their own side of the political spectrum. Finally, while about half of the subjects believed that discrimination against left- or right-leaning individuals in the field is not justified, a significant minority displayed an explicit willingness to discriminate against colleagues with the opposite ideology. Our findings are both surprising and important, because a commitment to tolerance and equality is widespread in philosophy, and there is reason to think that ideological similarity, hostility, and discrimination undermine reliable belief formation in many areas of the discipline. (shrink)

It can be hard to see where money fits in the world. Money seems both real and imaginary, since it has obvious causal powers, but is also, just as obviously, something humans have just made up. Recent philosophical accounts of money have declared it to be real, but for very different reasons. John Searle and Francesco Guala disagree over whether money is just whatever acts like money, or just whatever people believe to be money. In developing their accounts of institutions (...) as a part of social reality, each uses money as a paradigm institution, but they disagree on how institutions exist. Searle argues that the institution of money belongs to an ontological level separate from the physical world, held up by the collective intentions of a group, while Guala claims that money is a part of the ordinary physical world and is just whatever performs a “money-like function” in a group, regardless of what that group believes about it. Here, we argue that any purely functional account like Guala’s will be unable to capture the distinctive phenomenon of money, since monetary transactions are defined by the attitudes transactors hold toward them. Money will be obscured or misidentified if defined functionally. As we go on to show by examining recent work by Smit et al., belief in money does not require taking on all of Searle’s ontological commitments, but money and mental contents will stand or fall together. (shrink)

O objetivo deste trabalho é desafiar as correntes tradicionais da bioética, que fundamentam ideais abstratos de imparcialidade, cidadania universal e autonomia absoluta; confrontá-los a partir do conhecimento situado e do reconhecimento da matriz de dominação interseccional vigente na América Latina. Procura investigar como transformar múltiplas desigualdades, repolitizando a justiça interseccional, a agência política em momentos críticos de progresso e colonização dos nossos bens comuns. Nossa proposta final é uma bioética crítica interseccional, representativa e participativa, que inclua de forma não subordinada (...) as vozes e os conhecimentos dos outros, focada em nossas necessidades regionais, promovendo nossa autonomia relacional e o cuidado com a vida, em e para nossos territórios, comunidades e as gerações futuras. (shrink)

En el mundo académico contemporáneo han venido tomando fuerza, desde hace varias décadas, los temas de la interdisciplinariedad y la transdisciplinariedad, como respuesta de un sector de la comunidad científica a los problemas de la especialización y a la desconexión entre las ciencias. Como todo elemento o aspecto de la realidad, este tema requiere de una debida fundamentación filosófica que se encuentra en el pensamiento clásico. En el presente artículo se intenta mostrar la relación entre la tradición de la filosofía (...) perenne y este fundamento, atendiendo, sobre todo, a la importancia de la mirada holística del fenómeno ético y pretendiendo sustentar que el diálogo entre las ciencias sólo es posible rescatando el paradigma metafísico, legado por los griegos a la civilización occidental y defendido por MacIntyre en su libro "Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity. An Essay on Desire, Practical Reasoning, and Narrative" (University of Cambridge, 2016). (shrink)

Two studies investigated how planning affects intention-behavior consistency. In Study 1 an experimental group and control group which each consisted of 14 undergraduates were requested in computerized interviews to indicate which activities they intended to perform on the following day. Subjects in the experimental group were also requested in a second phase of the interviews to specify when and where they intended to perform the activities. The results showed that activities for which time and place had been specified were more (...) likely to be performed. In Study 2 another 75 undergraduates volunteered to participate in an experiment in which they were requested to perform an activity (reporting mood effects of reading a prose excerpt) by themselves on one of three following days. One group of subjects only agreed to perform the activity, another group agreed to perform the activity as well as indicated when and where they would do it, and a third group in addition to this indicated which other activities they would perform on the same day. In support of the hypothesis that planning an activity increases the likelihood that it will be performed, the results showed that subjects who indicated other activities more frequently performed the target activity. More efficient time management resulting from planning may account for the findings, although further research is needed to show this conclusively. (shrink)

In this paper, I intend to show that it’s a serious mistake to construe the role of sensible representation in Kant’s work as a nonconceptual content (in the contemporary and technical sense of “content”), which, like a mental indexical would refer to what appears in space and time in the so-called de re form. The interpretation I advance and further support is this: without possessing a representational content, sensible representation must be understood as the basic epistemic relation between the subject (...) and the physical entities in space and time she is acquainted with. Immediate reference of sensible intuition to their respective objects is to be understood as a form of knowledge by acquaintance. I call my own interpretation relationalism. (shrink)

This paper is a defense of the so-called phenomenal-concept strategy, based on a new view of phenomenal concepts as special de re modes of presentation of the phenomenal character of experience. Phenomenal concepts can be explained in physical terms as mental particulars (as phenomenal files) created in the individual’s mind to pick out the phenomenal character of experience by representing certain physical properties as those represented by the experiences themselves (metarepresentation). They are individuated by two fundamental relations: the perceptual (acquaintance) (...) relation the creature bears to the physical properties represented by its own experience and the relation the creature bears to itself (self-acquaintance) as the subject undergoing those experiences. Mary’s newly acquired phenomenal file presents the phenomenal character of her new experience of red by means of the new relation she bears to herself as the creature standing in the experiential relation to the color red. (shrink)

This paper is both systematic and historical in nature. From a historical viewpoint, I aim to show that to establish Wittgenstein’s claim that “an ‘inner process’ stands in need of outward criteria” (PI §580) there is an enthymeme in Wittgenstein’s private language argument (henceforth PLA) overlooked in the literature, namely Wittgenstein’s suggestion that both perceptual and bodily experiences are transparent in the relevant sense that one cannot point to a mental state and wonder “What is that?” From a systematic viewpoint, (...) I aim to show that Wittgenstein’s PLA teaches us that the prevailing picture of the nature of phenomenal concepts (henceforth PCs) is upside down: we can only introspectively know what is going on inside our heads after we learn of what is going on outside (PI §580). In this regard, I aim to defend two associate claims against the prevailing view of PCs on the basis of PLA. First, by means of transparency, I aim to show that there is no de re awareness of our private sensation that could determine the meaning of sensation words; for example, I am never aware of the phenomenal blueness of my experience of something blue. The second associated claim is that introspective self-knowledge of our private sensations is always de dicto. We can only know introspectively that phenomenal blueness is the phenomenal character of the experience we are undergoing after we have learned that (de dicto knowledge) blue is the color that usually causes us that kind of experience. Likewise, we can only introspectively know that pain is the phenomenal character of the experience we are undergoing after we have learned that pain is what usually causes some typical pain behavior. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is twofold: First, we present and develop a system of logic for pragmatics including the act of denial. Second, we analyse in our framework the so-called paradox of assertability. We show that it is possible to yield sentences that are not assertable. Moreover, under certain conditions, a symmetric result can be obtained: There is a specular paradox of deniability. However, this paradox is based on the problematic principle of classical denial equivalence.

Este artículo pretende ofrecer una visión alternativa tanto de la lectura conceptualista tradicional de Kant como de la nueva lectura no conceptualista. En contra de las lecturas conceptualistas tradicionales sostengo que confunden las condiciones para la representación sensible de los objetos (tesis de la intencionalidad) con las condiciones para el reconocimiento (Erkenntnis) de que representamos objetos mediante intuiciones sensibles (tesis del reconocimiento). En contra de las lecturas no conceptualistas sostengo que no distinguen el no conceptualismo -propio de la filosofía contemporánea (...) de la mente- de las tesis antiintelectualistas de Kant. Tales lecturas fracasan porque se equivocan al atribuir un contenido representacional a las intuiciones sensibles de Kant. Las intuiciones sensibles, según Kant, no presentan el mundo según ciertas condiciones de satisfacción que podrían o no ser satisfechas por el mundo. Por lo tanto, no son ni verídicas ni non verídicas. Se limitan a presentar el mundo de una manera directa, independiente de los conceptos, lo que llamaré aquí la presentación de re de los objetos. En mi lectura, la oposición entre intuiciones y conceptos es la oposición entre la presentación de re de um objeto y el reconocimento proposicional de dicto de que representamos algo como um objeto. (shrink)

O presente artigo examina os desafios éticos envolvidos no uso da inteligência artificial (IA) no sistema de justiça criminal. Inicialmente, a IA foi celebrada por suas promessas de aprimorar a elucidação de crimes e a criminologia preditiva, mas casos de aplicação equivocada e reforço de preconceitos levantam questões importantes. Para este artigo, utilizamos uma revisão bibliográfica qualitativa, analisando casos práticos e estudos acadêmicos relevantes para destacar os desafios e as implicações éticas do uso de IA no sistema de justiça criminal. (...) A bibliografia foi escolhida por seu rigor acadêmico e sua relevância atual, abordando tanto os sucessos quanto os fracassos da IA, além de fornecer uma visão crítica sobre os vieses e as consequências sociais do uso dessas tecnologias. A seleção das fontes visou garantir uma compreensão abrangente e equilibrada do tema, com foco na justiça e equidade. (shrink)

É comumente aceito, atualmente, que Aristóteles não teria enfrentado ou tentado seriamente resolver o famoso paradoxo do mentiroso, embora ele tenha sido formulado por Eubúlides de Mileto, membro da escola megárica e rival filosófico de Aristóteles. No máximo, assim reza a visão tradicional, ele parece apenas fazer uma menção desse paradoxo nas Refutações sofísticas, Capítulo 25, talvez esboçando a sua solução. O meu intento, no presente artigo, é desafiar essa opinião geral mostrando que o Estagirita fornece uma explicação implícita para (...) duas versões do paradoxo do mentiroso, a saber, a versão autorreferencial (que pode ser apresentada pela declaração: “esta declaração é falsa”), e a versão anafórica (que pode ser apresentada por meio de duas declarações mutuamente referentes como estas: “a próxima declaração é verdadeira” e “a declaração anterior é falsa”). A minha alegação é que a solução aristotélica para essas duas versões do paradoxo encontra-se no núcleo de sua refutação de duas teses, as quais denominei como tese da synalethia (que defende que toda declaração é verdadeira) e como tese da sympseudia (que defende que toda declaração é falsa). Tal refutação é realizada no oitavo capítulo do quarto Livro da Metafísica, um texto até agora subestimado pelos intérpretes modernos, mesmo sendo a parte final de um dos mais importantes escritos de Aristóteles. A solução aristotélica, assim defendo, é levada a cabo por meio dos seguintes princípios: (i) toda declaração é sempre precedida por um operador de verdade da forma ‘é verdade que...’, ou seja, toda declaração, qualquer que seja o que ela possa declarar a mais, primariamente assevera a sua própria verdade; e, em conformidade com o princípio anterior, (ii) toda declaração que assevera a sua própria falsidade ou acarreta a verdade de sua contraditória é necessariamente falsa. Através desses princípios, a refutação de Aristóteles da synalethia e da sympseudia é bem-sucedida. Mostrarei que obtemos uma boa solução para as versões do mentiroso acima mencionadas (e implicitamente presentes nas posições refutadas), apenas aplicando esses mesmos princípios a elas. Esse tipo de solução ao mentiroso tanto quanto para as teses antes citadas é muito parecido com aquele explicitamente encontrado nas obras de diversos filósofos, a saber, Guilherme de Sherwood, Tomás Bradwardine, João Buridano, Alberto da Saxônia, Paulo Venetus, Charles S. Peirce e Arthur Prior. Assim, também defendo que essa linhagem tem as suas raízes na solução de Aristóteles. (shrink)

_ Source: _Page Count 20 This paper proposes a new deflationary reading of the metaphor of the “primitive sense of selfhood” in perception and proprioception, usually understood as an “experiential self-reference” that takes place before reflection and any use of concepts. As such, the paper is also a new defense of the old orthodox view that self-consciousness is a highly complex mental phenomenon that requires equally complex concepts. The author’s defense is a clear case of inference to the best explanation. (...) He argues that postulating an “experiential _self-reference_” to explain the “primitive sense of selfhood” is as explanatory overkill as attributing perceptions to bacteria to explain the remarkably sophisticated ways in which they adapt, attune, and respond to their environments. This is what the author calls trivialization of self-consciousness. The metaphor of the “primitive sense of selfhood” in perception and proprioception is far less extravagantly explained by what, based on Recanati, the author calls self-involvement without self-consciousness: there is no “experiential self-reference” because there is no _self-reference_ in the first place. Rather than being articulated as a constituent of the contents of her/his perceptions or proprioception, the self/subject is the key element of the circumstance of evaluation of these selfless contents. (shrink)

The hypothesis of this paper is that legal positivism depends on the non plausibility of strong moral cognitivism because of the non necessary connection thesis between law and morality that legal positivism is supposed to acknowledge. The paper concludes that only when based on strong moral cognitivism is it consistent to sustain the typical non-positivistic thesis of the necessary connection between law and morality. Habermas’s Philosophy of law is confronted with both positions.

A evidência textual primária confirma que Schopenhauer estava ciente da adoção generalizada do confinamento solitário no sistema penitenciário americano e alguns de seus efeitos prejudiciais. Ele entende sua perniciosidade no que diz respeito ao tédio, fenômeno pelo qual é conhecido por ter nele pensado e analisado extensivamente. Neste artigo, eu interpreto o relato de Schopenhauer sobre o tédio e sua relação com o confinamento solitário. Defendo Schopenhauer contra a objeção de que os casos de confinamento servem apenas para ilustrar a (...) inadequação geral de sua explicação do tédio como a falta de coisas para se querer. Esta defesa chega à conclusão de que, ao contrário, alguém pode muito bem sofrer da falta de coisas para querer como resultado direto de estar confinado; e que o tédio, entendido como a privação de vontade — fenômeno que sugiro poder ser chamado de privação conativa — faz uma contribuição esclarecedora para a nossa compreensão teórica da nocividade do confinamento solitário. (shrink)

One way to detect, monitor and prevent adverse events with the help of Information Technology is by using ontologies capable of representing three levels of reality: what is the case, what is believed about reality, and what is represented. We report on how Basic Formal Ontology and Referent Tracking exhibit this capability and how they are used to develop an adverse event ontology and related data annotation scheme for the European ReMINE project.

In the last two decades we have witnessed considerable efforts directed towards making electronic healthcare records comparable and interoperable through advances in record architectures and (bio)medical terminologies and coding systems. Deep semantic issues in general, and ontology in particular, have received some interest from the research communities. However, with the exception of work on so-called ‘controlled vocabularies’, ontology has thus far played little role in work on standardization. The prime focus has been rather the rapid population of terminologies at the (...) level of fine detail. In this paper, we argue that more efforts are needed on the side of both research and standardization to ensure that the coding systems used in electronic healthcare records enjoy a semantics that is coherent with the semantics of the record. We propose realist ontology as a method to bring about this coherence by means of a robust system of top-level ontological categories. (shrink)

In this paper I take side on externalist incompatibilism. However, I intend to radicalize the position. First, based on my criticism of Burge's anaphoric proposal, I argue that there is no reasoning‐transparency: the reasoner is blind to the reasoning he is performing. Second, assuming a global form of content‐externalism, I argue that “in the head” are only logical and formal abilities. That is what I call “bite the bullet and swallow it too.”.

CAVALCANTI NETO, Lamartine de Hollanda. Contributions of Thomistic Psychology to the study of the plasticity of the ethos. 2012. 571s. Thesis (Doctorate in Bioethics) – Centro Universitário São Camilo, São Paulo,2012. If Ethics is not a static science, it is because ethos — its basic object of study — is a mutable reality. For this reason, ethical themes, chiefly those of Bioethics, are directly related to the study of the plasticity of the ethos. Nevertheless, such investigation requires that the researcher (...) distance himself from concrete ethical questions, to apply himself to the theoretical examination of what enables the existence and development of such questions — that is, the aforementioned plasticity. However, bibliographical literature on this subject has revealed a scarcity of works focused specifically on the theme. This scarcity seems to indicate that the subject is still in a process of methodological definition. Therefore, we propose as a research question, to investigate at the theoretical level, if Thomistic Psychology can be considered a valid study tool for the plasticity of ethos. For this aim, we adopt a documental and bibliographical research methodology adapted to the aforesaid question, based on the presupposition that such validity can be gauged to the extent that Thomistic Psychology offers objective contributions to the study of the plasticity of the ethos. Backed by extensive literature, we present an overview of Thomistic Psychology, as well as of ethos and its plasticity. With the data obtained, we establish a discussion with a view to identifying these contributions. Based on the results, we close with a reply, while still open, to our research question, hoping to afford, in this way, a kind of platform on which new studies can be developed with greater facility. (shrink)

O presente artigo se propõe definir o que é predicação em Aristóteles, como predicamos e qual o critério para determinar se uma predicação é verdadeira ou falsa. Nossas referências serão o livro Das Categorias, do capítulo 1 ao 5 e Da interpretação do capítulo 1 ao 6. Concluiremos que a teoria da predicação em Aristóteles afirma que definir algo é predicar e que o critério de verdade de uma proposição é a sua correspondência aos fatos.

Uma pesquisa revisando o pensamento gestáltico se justifica pelo intenso debate em torno da tese emergentista da mente. Sem a pretensão de uma exposição extensiva dos usos de noções emergentistas na análise do conceito de mente, realiza-se uma exposição do conceito com foco nas perspectivas de John R. Searle e de Evan Thompson. Ambos realizam uma defesa da emergência como conceito central na compreensão e explicação da relação mente corpo, mas o primeiro centrado no conceito de propriedades emergentes e o (...) segundo centrado no conceito de processos emergentes. Neste debate entendemos que contribuições da teoria da Gestalt podem se fazer interessantes. Apresenta-se neste contexto o pensamento gestáltico enfatizando o texto “Über ‘Gestaltqualitäten’ ” de 1932, ditado à sua esposa por Chistian von Ehrenfels (1859-1932) no ano de sua morte como um comentário a partir da repercussão de seu artigo “Über ‘Gestaltqualitäten’ ”, publicado em 1890 e comentado pelos três autores de maior repercussão da psicologia da Gestalt; Max Wertheimer (1880-1943), Kurt Koffka (1886-1941) e Wolfgang Köhler (1887-1967). (shrink)

The complexities of how justice comes to be realized, and by which agents, is a relatively neglected element in contemporary theories of justice. This has left several crucial questions about agency and justice undertheorized, such as why some particular agents are responsible for realizing justice, how their contribution towards realizing justice should be understood, and what role agents such as activists and community leaders play in realizing justice. We aim to contribute towards a better understanding of the landscape of these (...) kinds of questions. First, we argue that theorists should distinguish between (i) agents who are responsible for realizing justice, but not committed to it, (ii) agents who are not responsible for realizing justice, but who are committed to it, and (iii) agents who are both responsible for and committed to realizing justice. Second, we discuss how to incorporate agents of justice more robustly into theorizing about justice. (shrink)

Este artigo visa compreender o estado da arte do naturalismo contemporâneo a partir da discussão com posições não naturalistas, em especial as de Moore e Rawls. Parte-se da análise do argumento central destas abordagens no contexto formal da metaética contemporânea, buscando aferir a validade da falácia naturalista no contexto atual, bem como de seus limites na aplicação contra o naturalismo moral. Apresenta-se a discussão entre o naturalismo e o não-naturalismo moral como, respectivamente, estandartes das perspectivas descritivas e prescritivas da moralidade. (...) O objetivo com esta comparação é apresentar algumas posições em metaética a fim de melhor entender a situação contemporânea do debate moral no que tange à naturalização da ética, contrastando teorias da ação e do valor quanto ao tema da motivação e da normatividade morais. (shrink)

Este ensaio celebra as cinco décadas da publicação do livro A ordem do discurso de Michel Foucault, realizando uma reflexão acerca de sua repercussão entre as ciências sociais e sobre seus usos, principalmente, no campo da linguagem na parte relacionada à análise do discurso de linha francesa. Portanto, trata-se de uma retrospectiva crítica cuja análise começa com a entrevista que Foucault concedeu algumas semanas antes de proferir esta aula aos brasileiros Sergio Paulo Rouanet e José Guilherme Merquior. Em seguida, o (...) presente trabalho faz uma breve história da entrada de Foucault ao Collège de France e, por fim, lida com a microfísica do discurso que se encontra nesta aula, sobretudo, da rarefação do sujeito, além dos seus usos nas ciências humanas e sociais mais o campo da linguagem em torno da pragmática e das análises de discurso. (shrink)

O objetivo precípuo da nossa pesquisa consiste em analisar a correlação da luta por reconhecimento, Comissão Nacional da Verdade – CNV (2012 - 2014) e memória coletiva. Para alcançar o nosso objetivo, nos propomos à análise da memória a partir das lutas coletivas e sociais evocando a memória coletiva no âmbito de uma relação intersubjetiva que envolve disputas, negociações manipulações e esquecimento. É importante frisar que o quadro teórico de nosso trabalho está amparado no debate em torno das lutas por (...) reconhecimento. Para tanto, verificaremos a partir de Axel Honneth, a gramática moral das lutas em torno desse reconhecimento recíproco e como acontece essa dinâmica nas práticas sociais vigentes e, ipso facto pretendemos articular a discussão do paradigma da comunicação com a memória coletiva. (shrink)

Este trabalho apresenta algumas considerações a respeito da Base Nacional Comum Curricular (BNCC), no referente às questões ligadas ao ensino da língua portuguesa no Brasil, à territorialidade e ao pertencimento racial, processos históricos, que envolvem, no campo da educação, a formação docente e a construção da cidadania dos educandos e das educandas nestes tempos de reafirmação do Estado democrático de direito e da vaga decolonial. Portanto, trata-se de uma abordagem política em termos do pensamento de Paulo Freire, patrono da educação (...) brasileira, que considerava político o ato de educar (FREIRE, 1980; 1983; 1989; 1996). É com base nesta perspectiva que a BNCC será abordada, mas sob o aporte teórico da análise pragmática do discurso, tributária da análise discursivo-desconstrutiva (cf. ARAÚJO, 2020). (shrink)